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Except in pockets'of ignorance and malice, there is no longer an
ideological war between conservationists and developers. Both
share the perception that health and prosperity decline in a deterio-
rating environment. They also understand that useful products can-
not be harvested from extinct species. If dwindling wildlands are
mined for genetic material rather than destroyed for a few more
boardfeet of lumber and acreage of farmland, their economic yield
will be vastly greater over time. Salvaged species can help to revi-
talize timbering, agriculture, medicine, and other industries located
elsewhere. The wildlands are like a magic well; the more that is
drawn from them in knowledge and benefits, the more there will be
to draw.
- Edward 0. Wilson'
Something is fundamentally wrong in our country when a rat's
home is more important than an American's home. At the rate
we're going, it won't be long before we're forced to add people to
the Endangered Species List.
-Representative Billy Tauzin (D.-La.)2
INTRODUCTION
T hese are heady times for the champions of private property
rights.' The U.S. Supreme Court, in Dolan v. City of Tigard,'
building on the foundation laid in Nollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission5 and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,6 chastised a
local government for its apparent failure to demonstrate that the de-
velopment conditions placed on a commercial landowner were
"roughly proportional" to the city's goals of floodplain protection and
traffic regulation. Judges sitting on the U.S. Court of Claims ("Claims
* Professor of Law and History, University of Richmond. The author thanks Jay
Taylor for his vigilant and skillful research assistance.
1. EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 282 (1992).
2. W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, 'If You Take It, Pay For A,': Something's Wrong When a
Rat's Home Is More Important than an American's Home, Roll Call, July 25, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Tauzin I].
3. See, e.g., Richard Miniter, You Just Can't Take it Anymore: America's Property
Rights Revolt, POL. REV., Fall 1994, at 40.
4. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
5. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
6. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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Court"), a veritable hotbed of regulatory takings activity,7 have issued
a series of opinions resulting in hefty bills for federal defendants.8
Most intriguingly, the election of Republican majorities in both
houses of Congress, impelled in part by public promises by party lead-
ers to live up to the terms of the "Contract with America,"9 has dra-
7. See, e.g., Roger J. Marzulla & Nancie G. Marzulla, Regulatory Takings in the
United States Claims Court: Adjusting the Burdens That in Fairness and Equity Ought
to Be Borne by Society as a Whole, 40 CAH. U. L. REV. 549 (1991); George W. Miller
& Jonathan L. Abram, A Survey of Recent Takings Cases in the Court of Federal
Claims and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 863
(1993); Michael Allan Wolf, Takings Term II: New Tools for Attacking and Defending
Environmental and Land-Use Regulation, 13 N. ILL. L. REV. 469, 504-10 (1993);
Thomas Hanley, Comment, A Developer's Dream: The United States Claims Court's
New Analysis of Section 404 Takings Challenges, 19 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 317
(1991); Patrick Kennedy, Comment, The United States Claims Court: A Safe "Harbor"from Government Regulation of Privately Owned Wetlands, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
723 (1992); Timothy G. Warner, Note, Recent Decisions by the United States Claims
Court and the Need for Greater Supreme Court Direction in Wetlands Protections
Cases, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 901 (1992); Seth E. Zuckerman, Note, Loveladies Har-
bor, Inc. v. United States: The Claims Court Takes a Wrong Turn-Toward a Higher
Standard of Review, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 753 (1991).
8. See Wolf, supra note 7 (citing $60,296,000 judgment in Whitney Benefits, Inc.
v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394, 417 (1989), corrected by 20 Cl. Ct. 324 (1990), aff'd,
926 F.2d 1169, 1174, 1178 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 952 (1991) (taking effected
by statutory prohibition of surface mining of alluvial valley floors); $2,658,000 judg-
ment in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 160-61 (1990), aff'd,
28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Army Corps of Engineers' [hereinafter Corps] denial of
fill permit); and $933,921 judgment in Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 340-
41 (1992) (same). A fourth instance of compensation for a regulatory taking, the
$1,029,000 judgment in Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 175-
76 (1990) (same), was vacated and remanded by Florida Rock Industries Inc. v.
United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3534 (Jan. 17,
1995). See also Goodwyn v. United States, Nos. 91-1575L & 92-120L, 1994 WL
703384 (Cl. Ct. Dec. 15, 1994) (construction of dike by Corps destroyed property
rights; $1.3 million judgment); Bowles v. United States, 31 Cl. Ct. 37, 53 (1994)
($55,000 judgment for Corps' denial of permit to fill lot to install septic system); NRG
Co. v. United States, 30 Cl. Ct. 460 (1994) (taking effected by statutory cancellation of
permits to explore for coal on Native American lands). The judgment amounts do not
include interest, court costs, and attorney's fees, which can prove extremely costly to
the government as well.
9. See, e.g., The GOP Contract on the Environment, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 3, 1995, at
A16:
The Republicans' controversial "Contract With America" legislative
agenda does not mention even once the word "environment." Yet buried
throughout the contract's legislative proposals, which the signatories have
promised to pass in the first 100 days, is a wholesale assault on the entire
body of environmental protections achieved over the last 25 years-a virtual
clear-cutting of laws and regulations designed to conserve environmental re-
sources and protect human health and safety.
The main offending section of the contract is the misnamed "Job Creation
and Wage Enhancement Act." Among other features,. it would require the
government to compensate property owners for the imposition of any fed-
eral regulation that reduces the value of a business or property by 10
percent.
See Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§§ 9001-9004 (1995).
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matically increased the chances for congressional passage of
legislation protecting landowners from the economic effects of a wide
range of environmental and land-use regulations.
Others may catalogue' ° and investigate the intricacies of" the grow-
ing number of proposals that have been circulating over the past few
years to require agencies of federal, state and local government to
take more seriously the important task of protecting Americans' pri-
vate property rights. Indeed, just keeping track of property rights
statutes, not to mention the property rights movement,' 2 is a daunting
task that falls outside the scope and intent of this Article.
Accordingly, this Article proposes a different, though related, ap-
proach. This Article will explore two key rhetorical strategies em-
ployed by legislative champions of the property rights movement: (1)
relating horror stories about innocent citizens whose property is se-
verely devalued or appropriated by the acts of (allegedly) overzealous
officials enforcing (apparently) confiscatory and irrational laws; and
(2) contrasting the profound and patriotic motives, goals, and strate-
gies furthered by the property rights movement with the ignoble and
nefarious tactics of environmentalists and their governmental allies.
The "database" for this exploration consists of public statements
made by members of Congress in support of the Private Property
Owners Bill of Rights ("Owners Bill"),'3 the most serious challenge
10. See, e.g., Robert Meltz, Property Rights Legislation in the 103rd Congress
(1994) (Congressional Research Service report).
11. See, e.g., John Martinez, Statutes Enacting Takings Law: Flying in the Face of
Uncertainty, 26 URB. L. 327 (1994); David J. Russ, How the "Property Rights" Move-
ment Threatens Property Values in Florida, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395 (1994);
Recent Legislation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 519 (1994) (analysis of Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-
90-1 to -4; §§ 63-90a-1 to -4 (Supp. 1994)).
12. See, e.g., Miniter, supra note 3; Peter Overby, The Politics of Mining; Ronald
Reagan and Ed Meese Left Behind a Movement that Could Threaten Environmental,
Health and Safety Regulations, Common Cause, June-Aug. 1994, available in LEXIS,
Nexis library, CURNWS File.
13. H.R. 3875, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Owners Bill]; S. 1915, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). The text of H.R. 3875 is included as the Appendix to this
Article. These two nearly identical bills are the specific focus of this Article, although
the rhetoric associated with these proposals has been employed by advocates of other
federal property rights legislation. As the 104th Congress began its first session,
Tauzin reintroduced the House version and Senator Richard Shelby introduced a
slightly amended version of the Owners Bill. See H.R. 790, S. 239, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995). The most significant modification is that compensation is available to
property owners who have been "deprived of $10,000, or 20 percent or more, of the
fair market value of the affected portion of the property ... ." S. 239 § 9(a). In the
earlier House and Senate versions, compensation would be available to "a private
property owner that, as a consequence of a final qualified agency action of an agency
head, is deprived of 50 percent or more of the fair market value, or the economically
viable use, of the affected portion of the property .... ." H.R. 3875, § 8(a); S. 1915,
§ 8(a). One of the Republican "Contract with America" bills goes even farther than
the 1995 version of the Owners Bill, requiring compensation for reduction of even
10% of value. Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, H.R. 9, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess., § 9002(a)(2)(B) (1995).
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yet posed to the decades-old practice of judicial resolution of regula-
tory takings challenges. 14 As variations on the bill make their way
through the 104th Congress, on their own' 5 or as part of the Job Crea-
tion and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995,16 one can expect the assault
on environmental and land-use regulations to grow even more fierce.
By studying the stories, symbols, and hyperbole comprising this pri-
vate property offensive, one can draw two important conclusions: (1)
many of the most prominent legislative champions of expanded pri-
vate property rights have, somewhat recklessly, targeted federal en-
dangered species regulations as particularly unjustifiable and
unnecessary, and (2) this is probably just the opening salvo in a more
wide-ranging attack on regulations, ordinances, statutes and even
principles of judicial interpretation that shield the public-at-large from
extant and anticipated harms. These two realities should not only dis-
turb opponents, but should also concern advocates of increased pro-
tections for private property owners. For, as important debates such
as this one advance beyond the fifteen-second soundbite stage, the
rhetorical posturing that accompanies bill sponsorship often dissolves
when votes are officially tallied. Moreover, as the difficult task of
drafting the language required to reach a majority or, in the face of a
veto, a supermajority, begins, it becomes increasingly difficult to hide
controversial agendas.
I. THE HORROR: GIVING BIRTH TO A MODEST PROPOSAL
The Owners Bill, introduced into the House of Representatives as
H.R. 3875 on February 23, 1994, and into the Senate as S. 1915 on
March 17, 1994, is an ambitious proposal. According to its chief spon-
sor, Representative W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, a Louisiana Democrat who
toyed with the idea of switching parties in the wake of Republican
victories in November 1994,' 7 the Owners Bill:'
8
14. The rivers of ink spilled and forests of trees felled in the effort to understand
the field of regulatory takings is legendary. For examples of the author's "two cents,"
see, e.g., CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL A. WOLF, LAND-USE PLANNING 875-922
(4th ed. 1989); Wolf, supra note 7; Michael A. Wolf, Dolan, Lucas, and the Fruits of
the "Impenetrable Jungle": Navigating the Boundary Between Land-Use Planning
and Environmental Law (Jan. 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the FORD-
HAM ENVTL. L.J.).
15. See, e.g., S. 239, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (Shelby's latest version of the
Owners Bill).
16. See supra note 9.
17. Tauzin has signed on for at least one more year with the Democrats. See John
Biskupic, Conservative Democrats Plan Coalition in House, WASH. POST, Dec. 21,
1994, at A20. In the wake of the November 1994 elections, Senator Richard Shelby of
Alabama, the chief sponsor of the Owners Bill in the Senate, switched party alle-
giance to the G.O.P. See Joel Achenbach & Phil McCombs, The Day After: Sifting
Through the Wreckage, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1994, at D1.
18. Tauzin I, supra note 2; W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Private Property & Public Rights,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 15, 1994, at 19 [hereinafter Tauzin II].
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- requires federal agencies to comply with applicable state and tri-
bal laws relating to private property rights and privacy; 19
- prohibits federal agencies that are implementing ESA or wet-
lands regulations from entering private property for the purpose of
gathering information without written consent from the owner;
20
- sets up an administrative appeals process for property owners
confronted by adverse ESA and wetlands rulings; ' and
- requires compensation to owners who are deprived of 50 percent
or more of the fair market value or the economically viable use of
their property because of such rulings.2
While his opponents cry that Congressman Tauzin is the mouthpiece
for big business and large-scale developers,23 Tauzin claims that he
joined the ranks of state and federal lawmakers displeased with the
judicial mode of resolving disputes between landowners and environ-
mental and land-use regulators as a response to the needs of others:
"My commitment to this issue was born out of the horror stories that
average, middle-class landowners shared with me."'24
While others spend their energies examining Tauzin's apparent ties
to the largest stakeholders in this fight, I find it more useful to con-
sider the very stories that he and others claim gave rise to activism on
behalf of the Owners Bill. After each tale is told, the tough questions
can then be addressed: why is this story relevant to the environmental
legislation targeted by Tauzin and his allies ("the relevance inquiry");
and how, if at all, would the Owners Bill affect the "horror" symbol-
ized by the story ("the effect inquiry")?
HORROR STORIES #1, #2, AND #3: When you lose your job in the
state of Washington because of an owl, your shrimp boat in Louisi-
ana because of a turtle, or your home in California because of a rat,
the cost of environmental protection hits home. 5
There can be no doubt that to many Americans in the 1990s, the
northern spotted owl, for good or bad, is the "poster species" of the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). 6 The logging industry has kept the
national press well-informed regarding the economic impact of the
ESA on the industry, its employees, and their families. 27 Therefore, it
cannot be denied that the first horror story-loss of "your job in the
State of Washington because of an owl"-has some relevance to the
19. Owners Bill, supra note 13, § 3.
20. Id § 4.
21. Id. §§ 6 (wetlands), 7 (ESA).
22. Id. § 8.
23. See, e.g., Peter A.A. Berle, Private Property and Public Rights, CHRISTIAN ScI.
MONITOR, Aug. 15, 1994, at 19.
24. Tauzin, supra note 2.
25. See Tauzin I, supra note 2; Tauzin II, supra note 18.
26. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
27. See, e.g., Glen Martin, Endangered Listing Could List to Huge Fracas: After the
Spotted Owl Turmoil, Its "Coho Chaos," S.F. CHRON., Nov. 24, 1994, at Al; Out of the
Woods?, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 10, 1995, (editorial) at B6.
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Owners Bill. That relevance diminishes significantly when one recalls
that the primary setting for the legal dispute concerning the owl was
federal land and that the commercial interests involved had no "prop-
erty interest" in the regulated public lands.28 Rather, the timber com-
panies sought to continue to participate in lucrative auctions resulting
in sales contracts on timber removed from federally owned and man-
aged old-growth forests.29
Moreover, as District Court Judge William L. Dwyer noted in his
factual finding in Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans,3 ° the owl is not
the only, or even the major, culprit:
Over the past decade many timber jobs have been lost and mills
closed in the Pacific Northwest. The main reasons have been mod-
ernization of physical plants, changes in product demand, and com-
petition from elsewhere....
Job losses in the wood products industry will continue regardless
of whether the northern spotted owl is protected. A credible esti-
mate is that over the next twenty years more than 30,000 jobs will
be lost to worker-productivity increases alone.31
Finally, the effect of the Owners Bill on timber jobs would appear
to be minimal. To this point, regulatory takings challenges to the ESA
by private landowners have been quite rare, even in the Claims
Court.32 Indeed, two recent developments further militate against
such challenges: (1) the willingness of the current administration to
accommodate private owners of old-growth forests,33 and (2) the pos-
28. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1299-1300 (W.D.
Wash. 1994) ("The legality of a forest management plan adopted by the Secretaries of
Agriculture and Interior must be decided in these consolidated cases. Among the
federal lands in Washington, Oregon, and Northern California are about twenty-four
million acres that are within the geographic range of the northern spotted owl.").
29. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1096 (W.D.
Wash. 1991) ("[T]he public interest and the balance of equities require the issuance of
an injunction directing the Forest Service to comply with the requirements of NFMA
[National Forest Management Act] by March 5, 1992, and preventing it from selling
additional logging rights in spotted owl habitat until it complies with the law.").
30. 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
31. 1& at 1095.
32. See, e.g., Bruce Babbitt, The Endangered Species Act and "Takings": A Call for
Innovation Within the Terms of the Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 355, 361 (1994); Robert Meltz,
Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered Species Act and Private Property, 24
ENVTL. L. 369, 385-91 (1994).
33. See, e.g., Babbitt, supra note 32; Eric Pyne, High Court's Decision on Habitat
Protection: Ruling of the Decade?-Law's Effect on Nonfederal Land at Issue, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File, which
states:
The Clinton administration, attempting to avoid a backlash against the
Endangered Species Act in Congress, has tried for two years to show the law
is more adaptable than its reputation.
A previously little-used section of the law [section 10(b)] allows landown-
ers to avoid such rigid restrictions as the owl circles if they prepare and win
federal approval for tailor-made "habitat conservation plans."
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sibility that the U.S. Supreme Court will affirm the lower court's hold-
ing in Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v.
Babbitt,34 thereby neutralizing habitat protection restrictions under
the ESA.
The second horror story-loss of a "shrimp boat in Louisiana be-
cause of a turtle"-is also, to put it kindly, something of a stretch.
The frightful situation to which Tauzin is referring involves "the
[Commerce] Secretary's regulations requiring shrimp trawlers to in-
stall and use 'turtle excluder devices,' also known as 'TEDs,' in their
nets or to limit their trawling to 90 minutes or less at a time."35 But
things appear to be much more horrible for the five species of endan-
gered and threatened sea turtles that are unfortunate enough to share
the waters with shrimp boats:
Researchers have found that during shrimping operations, sea tur-
tles are caught in the large nets, or trawls, pulled behind commercial
shrimping vessels. The nets drag the turtles behind the boats and
thereby prevent them from surfacing for air. According to one
study, once a turtle is within the mouth of a shrimp trawl, the
animal's initial reaction is to attempt to outswim the device. Of
course, this strenuous effort consumes oxygen but affords the turtle
no opportunity to replenish the supply. Once trapped, if the ex-
hausted turtle is not released quickly, it will drown. Research cited
in the administrative record indicates that trawl times in excess of 90
minutes are highly likely to result in the death of a captured turtle.36
While shrimp boat owners may be near and dear to the heart of Mr.
Tauzin, particularly those in Louisiana's Third District, the Owners
Bill would do little to improve their economic situation. First, as with
logging jobs in the Pacific Northwest, shrimp boats in the Gulf of
Mexico (and elsewhere) are not "land," "any interest in land," or "any
proprietary water right. '37 Second, the economic impact of the regu-
lation does not appear to be even a single lost boat: annual costs per
shrimper (including the price of TEDs and up to five percent of
shrimp lost during the start-up period) have been estimated to be less
than $350.38
Such plans offer owners greater management flexibility while still protect-
ing species, officials say.
The Clinton Interior Department has persuaded more than 100 landown-
ers to begin work on such plans. At a conference late last year, Joseph Sax,
Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt's top legal adviser, cited the efforts as evi-
dence the Endangered Species Act works.
34. 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995) (invalidating
inclusion of "significant habitat modification or degradation" in FWS rule defining
"harm" under § 9(a)(1)(B) of the ESA).
35. Louisiana ex reL Guste v. Verity, 853 F.2d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1988).
36. Id at 325.
37. Owners Bill, supra note 13, § 5.
38. Guste, 853 F.2d at 331.
1995]
644 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
The last of this terrible trio-loss of "your home in California be-
cause of a rat"-is also problematic for advocates of the Owners
Bill.39 Here is Tauzin's version:
This insanity came to a head last year during the California brush
fires. Many people watched in dismay as their homes burned down
because they were not allowed to dig around them and create fire
breaks. Why? Because the US Fish and Wildlife Service summarily
and arbitrarily determined that such precautions would disturb the
habitat of the kangaroo rat. Imagine that. A rat!40
A leading environmentalist has called this tale "the favorite 'horror
story' of Endangered Species Act opponents."
4 1
There can be no doubt about the fact that the wildfire in the River-
side, California area in late October 1993, known as the California
Fire,4 2 left a legacy of destruction and heartbreak, particularly for the
families in the twenty-nine homes destroyed by the inferno:
The California Fire erupted at about 11:30 p.m. on October 26,
1993, burned throughout the following day, and was officially con-
tained on October 30. The fire ignited when a power line was blown
down in high winds. Fanned by winds of up to about 80 miles per
hour, the fire covered about 12,000 acres in the first 6 hours and
destroyed most of the 29 homes. According to county fire depart-
ment officials, the fire was of such force, magnitude, heat, and speed
that there was no way to suppress it when it was at its full force.
Fire experts explained that the speed at which the fire spread, its
extreme heat, its 100- to 150-foot-high walls of flames, and its tor-
nado-like winds make describing the fire to someone difficult if that
person did not experience it.
43
What is dubious are the claims by some of the affected landowners,
and their allies in the property rights movement, that the Fish and
Wildlife Service's ("FWS") protection of the endangered Stephens'
kangaroo rat," "a small nocturnal mammal within a unique family of
rodents more closely related to squirrels than to mice and rats,"45 is
the real culprit.
39. See 140 CONG. REC. E224 (Feb. 23, 1994) (Statement of Rep. Jack Fields)
[hereinafter Fields Statement], available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Record File: "We
have new tyrants depriving us of our inalienable rights of life, liberty, and property-
King George has been replaced by bureaucrats and kangaroo rats."
40. Tauzin I, supra note 2; Tauzin II, supra note 18.
41. GAO Debunks Endangered Species "Horror Story," Bus. WIRE, July 14, 1994
(quoting Michael Bean, Chair of Environmental Defense Fund), available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
42. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr-IMPACr
oF SPECIES PROTECrION EFFORTS ON THE 1993 CALIFORNIA FIRE (July 15, 1994)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT], available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
43. Id
44. See 50 C.F.R. § 1711 (1994); 53 Fed. Reg. 38,465 (Sept. 30, 1988) ("Determina-
tion of Endangered Status for the Stephens' Kangaroo Rat").
45. GAO REPORT, supra note 42.
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Linking the FWS with the devastation requires a causative trail on
the scale of the most demanding fact pattern on a first-year torts
exam: the FWS listed the kangaroo rat and mandated that its habitat
be protected. Protecting the rat meant that homeowners could not
use disking as a mode of weed abatement on their properties, thus
subjecting their homes to increased risk of loss in the wildfires that
plague southern California. When the California fire began, because
the homeowners were not allowed to disk and thereby clear a fire-
break, the homes were doomed.46
When a homeowner whose home was spared revealed on ABC's
"20/20" that he had defied the FWS and disked his property, property
rights advocates may have thought that they had all the ammunition
they needed. 47 However, a General Accounting Office ("GAO")
study requested by Senator Max Baucus and other supporters of the
ESA weakened some of the key links in the causative chain.
First, although the FWS outlawed disking, other weed-abatement
techniques were permitted and encouraged by local fire officials. Sec-
ond, one mobile home on an undisked site was surrounded by the fire
but spared. Third, this was not a conflagration that respected natural
and artificial firebreaks: "The fire repeatedly jumped many potential
barriers that appeared to be reasonable forms of limiting or stopping
its spread through western Riverside County. Such barriers included
highways, paved and gravel roads, cleared agricultural fields, and the
San Diego Canal. 48
Even if one accepts the Tauzin version of the California fire, serious
questions concerning the applicability of the Owners Bill's compensa-
tion provisions remain. Section 8(a) of the Owners Bill .is available to
property owners who experience deprivations "as a consequence of a
final qualified agency action of an agency head. '49 To fit the kangaroo
rat scenario included above within the definition of this italicized
phrase, a court will be asked to move far beyond traditional proximate
cause standards.
HORROR STORY #4: In Maryland, a couple was prohibited from
preventing erosion on their property because the government told
them that it might destroy tiger beetles. Meanwhile, a fifteen-foot
46. See, e.g., Steve Yozniak, Proposition 3000: Private Property Rights Protection
Act Puts State in National Spotlight, Amiz. REPUBLic, Nov. 2, 1994, at 10, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
47. Jessica Mathews, Endangered Species: The Truth, WASH.- POST, July 17, 1994,
at C7, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
48. GAO REPORT, supra note 42. But see New Studies Take Issue with GAO Re-
port on California Fire, Cal. Env't Daily (BNA), Aug. 19, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CURNWS File (citing reports, one entitled "Rats, Lies and the GAO,"
critical of GAO Report).
49. Owners Bill, supra note 13, § 8(a).
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section of their propertyylunged into the bay. Their home is now
the endangered species.5
This morality tale is a favorite among opponents of the ESA,
although the details vary from one retelling to the next.5' As with
Tauzin's tales, this account of "beetlemania"52 is exaggerated and
largely outside the reach of the Owners Bill.
First, whether the landowners in this instance, Richard and Barbara
Bannister of Lusby, Maryland, could claim that they purchased the
parcel with "reasonable investment-backed expectations"53 is far from
certain. Even a wholly sympathetic account of the Bannisters' plight
reveals that the couple "knew that the house they bought overlooking
the Chesapeake Bay in Lusby had problems. They knew it needed
work inside and out. They knew it faced erosion that could send it
over a 60-foot cliff." In fact, the previous owner of the property had
already experienced serious erosion problems. 54 Undoubtedly, the
discovery of endangered puritan tiger beetles on the property is not
the "but-for cause" of the Bannisters' problems.
Second, the house did not fall into the Chesapeake Bay. While the
loss of fourteen feet of the parcel is no laughing matter, this depriva-
tion would not appear to meet the fifty percent threshold of the Own-
ers Bill.
Third, and most important, the Owners Bill would also be inapplica-
ble to this case because the agency that put a temporary halt to the
Bannisters' revetment construction plans was the Maryland Depart-
ment of Natural Resources ("DNR"). 55 The Owners Bill sanctions
"qualified agency action[s]" by "agency heads. '56 These are federal
agencies, a fact made clear by the Owners Bill's use of definitions
from the Administrative Procedure Act.57
50. Fields Statement, supra note 39.
51. See, e.g., Walter Williams, Here's How Congress Meddles in Our Lives, CINCIN-
NATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 2, 1994, at E3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS
File (discusses "federal agents" and loss of "22 feet").
52. Maryland Hugs a Bug, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1994, at E2, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
53. See Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (Court "has ex-
amined the 'taking' question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that
have identified several factors-such as the economic impact of the regulation, its
interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the
governmental action-that have particular significance.")
54. Interview with Janet McKegg, Director, Natural Heritage Program, Maryland
Department of Natural Resources (Feb. 7, 1995) [hereinafter McKegg Interview].
55. Indeed, the federal agency that was involved in the situation, the Corps, had
initially approved the Bannisters' anti-erosion strategy. Maryland Hugs a Bug, supra
note 52; McKegg Interview, supra note 54.
56. Owners Bill, supra note 13, § 8(a).
57. Id. § 9(6). This section refers to the definition of "agency action" in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1988). The APA defines "agency" as
"each authority of the Government of the United States . .." 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)
(1988).
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The target of the Bannisters' complaint was not the ESA, but Mary-
land's Nongame and Endangered Species Conservation Act.58 This
legislation is in fact more restrictive than the federal act, because, un-
like the ESA, the Maryland act does not include an incidental "take"
provision.5 9 The only exception to the state act's broad reach is a
provision permitting the taking of an endangered species "for scien-
tific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the affected
species."6 This narrow exception provided the solution to the Ban-
nisters' (and the state's) predicament: the couple was allowed to shore
up its property and in the process "take" some of the endangered
beetles after agreeing to pay for research on the survival of the
species. 6'
HORROR STORY #5: In Idaho, farmers have coexisted with the mi-
croscopic Bruneau Hot Spring Snail [sic] for generations until the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service listed the snail as endangered. Now,
the Service has told area farmers they can no longer share the
water, and rural farming must be shut down so as not to disturb the
snail's habitat. Not only that, but the Service has also prohibited
any cattle grazing. An entire valley of people was out of business.
Fortunately, a U.S. District Judge has declared the Service's
designation as arbitrary and capricious and delisted the snail. But
this case is the exception, not the rule.62
This is perhaps the most puzzling of the terror tales spun by Owners
Bill advocates. The relevance to the ESA is apparent, given the fact
that the FWS did indeed attempt to list the Bruneau Hot Spring-
snail,63 much to the dismay of local ranchers. 64
However, in December 1993, Senior U.S. District Court Judge Har-
old L. Ryan issued an order in Idaho Farm Bureau Federation v. Bab-
bitt6 5 that in effect de-listed the snail:
In light of the serious due process violations committed by the F
& W Service, the court holds unlawful and sets aside the F & W
Service final decision to list the springsnail as an endangered species
under the Endangered Species Act. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
58. MD. CODE ANN. NAT. RES. §§ 10-2A-01 to -09 (1990 & Supp. 1994).
59. ESA § 10(a)(2)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B) (1988).
60. ME). CODE ANN. NAT. RES. § 10-2A-05 (1990).
61. McKegg Interview, supra note 54.
62. 140 CONG. REC. S2639 (Mar. 9, 1994) (Statement of Sen. Conrad Bums) [here-
inafter Bums Statement], available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Record File.
63. Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 839 F. Supp. 739 (D. Idaho 1993); 58 Fed.
Reg. 5938 (1993) ("Determination of Endangered Status for the Bruneau Hot Spring-
snail in Southwestern Idaho").
64. See, e.g., Andrew Garber, Tiny Snail Could Separate Ranchers from Their
Wells, GANNETr NEWS SERV., Dec. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
ARCNWS File (" 'It's damn scary,' said Jean Jewett, who worries the tiny, black mol-
lusk could close her cattle ranch, located in the rolling sagebrush-covered hills outside
Bruneau.").
65. Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 839 F. Supp. 739 (D. Idaho 1993).
1995]
648 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
§ 706(2)(A), the court finds the final rule to be arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with law.66
Ryan was frustrated by a comedy of procedural errors: "the FWS
failed to make the decision in the allotted timeframe under the ESA,
failed to provide an adequate public comment period, failed to make
available key scientific evidence during, the comment period, and
drafted the final listing rule before the last comment period even
began. 67
What is curious is that opponents of the ESA would cite this dispute
as an illustration of why the existing system of endangered species
protection needs to be fixed with proposals such as the Owners Bill.
A full-blown trial was not needed to convince the court of the FWS's
lapses, as the issue was decided at the summary judgment stage less
than one year after the listing of the snail.' A complete picture of the
ESA includes not only the final legislation and rules, but also public
input, congressional oversight, and, as Judge Ryan would remind us,
judicial review of agency action and inaction. This is a system that, for
all the controversy it has engendered, is not yet broken.
The horror story quoted above refers to the snail tale as "the excep-
tion, not the rule."69 This is certainly true, for Idaho Farm Bureau is
the first instance of a judicial de-listing of an endangered species.7" In
other words, the prevailing "rule" is that federal bureaucrats, because
their acts and omissions are so often subject to judicial scrutiny, are
generally attentive to the substantive and procedural mandates in-
cluded by Congress in the ESA.
HORROR STORY #6: In Montana last year, there was a headline that
read like this: "Judge Says Grizzlies Have People Rights." . . . The
story was about a rancher, John Shuler, at Choteau, MT [sic], who
shot a grizzly bear in 1989 after he found three of these bears in his
sheep corrals. He originally fired the shot to scare the bears away,
but one bear did not scare and instead the bear charged him and he
was forced to shoot the bear....
The judge ruled that the Endangered Species Act self-defense
exception must meet the same requirements used in criminal
law for humans. The judge ruled that since this rancher had
stepped off his porch to protect his investment, he purposefully
placed himself in the zone of imminent danger of a bear attack.
According to this judge, the rancher did not have the right to
66. Idaho Farm Bureau, 839 F. Supp. at 752.
67. Judge Cites FWS Procedural Violations, Orders Delisting of Endangered Snail,
Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA), Dec. 20, 1993 [hereinafter Judge Cites FWS], available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
68. Idaho Farm Bureau, 839 F. Supp. at 753. The listing date was January 25, 1993,
and the case was decided the following December 14.
69. Bums Statement, supra note 62.
70. Judge Cites FWS, supra note 66.
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protect his property. And, folks, that probably calls for an atti-
tudinal change, but basically that is wrong.71
We might easily concede that this frightening tale of a grizzly bear
attack calls for an "attitudinal change," and indeed there has been
some experimentation with private compensation for ranchers whose
animals are victimized by dangerous endangered species.72 It does not
necessarily follow, though, that the legislative change proposed by
Senator Burns-the Owners Bill-would address the Shuler situation
in any meaningful way, as the specific dispute did not involve the de-
valuation of any real property.
Also problematic is Senator Bums's account of the judge's rulings.
First, Administrative Law Judge Sweitzer, in United States Fish &
Wildlife Service v. Shuler,73 did not "rule[ ] that the Endangered Spe-
cies Act self-defense exception must meet the same requirements used
in criminal law for humans."74 The opinion characterizes the "law of
self-defense with respect to criminal proceedings" as "appropriate for
consideration although not controlling."75
Second, stepping off his porch at around 10:30 p.m. to chase and
wound the grizzly that was threatening his sheep was not the only way
in which Shuler placed himself in danger. The next morning Shuler
took his truck and his dog in search of the wounded bear, located the
bear, and shot it three times.76 Indeed, Mr. Shuler considered himself
"lucky" to have been put in harm's way:
The way it was presented to me was the fact that I did get lucky.
The situation could have gone the other way. I could have been two
feet behind, slow getting out of the house, and the bears could have
left. The bears could have crossed out of the light, and I wouldn't
have seen them and wouldn't have done anything.
And I made the statement to implicate I was lucky. The cards fell
into place.77
Finally, the judge noted that "the regulations do not forbid plaintiffs
from personally defending their property by means other than killing
grizzly bears."78 This is not an assertion that Shuler "did not have the
71. Bums Statement, supra note 62.
72. See Deroy Murdock, Using Property Rights to Gain Ecological Goals, SAN Di-
EGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File
which states: "Defenders of Wildlife in Washington, D.C., has a far better idea. It
launched a $100,000 fund to compensate ranchers for any livestock killed by at-risk
gray wolves in Montana. Since 1987, the fund has paid some $12,000 to a dozen
Montanans who suffered wolf-related animal losses."
73. 1993 NOAA LEXIS 14 (U.S. Dep't of Interior A.L.J. decision, Mar. 11, 1993).
74. Burns Statement, supra note 62.
75. Shuler, 1993 NOAA LEXIS 14 at *13.
76. Id. at *7-*9.
77. Id. at *25 (quoting Transcript).
78. Id. at *15.
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right to protect his property."79 It is a reminder that Shuler, like all
responsible citizens, can not go too far in the defense of property:
"The regulations are reasonable in requiring private citizens to seek
the assistance of experienced government officials, who may be ex-
pected to protect the public interest, rather than leaving every individ-
ual free to kill a 'nuisance bear' whenever he or she deems it
necessary. 80
Shuler also asserted, in a posthearing brief, that he was "entitled to
compensation from FWS for the 'taking' of his sheep by grizzly bear
#53/54, which, according to Mr. Shuler, was acting as an agent of
FWS."' Judge Sweitzer ruled, however, that the administrative pro-
ceeding was an improper forum to decide such a constitutional issue.82
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has already spoken on this
issue, concluding that "the ESA and the grizzly bear regulations do
not effect a taking of plaintiff's property by the government so as to
trigger the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment, and that
the government is not answerable for the conduct of the bears in tak-
ing plaintiffs' property."8 3
Although one Supreme Court Justice and at least two law student
authors disagree with this logic,8 4 this form of "taking" is not yet judi-
cially recognized. Neither, by the way, is it recognized under the
Owners Act, which does not provide compensation for deprivations of
personal property.
There is no question that, upon hearing or reading these tales of
woe, if would be difficult for other politicians and their constituents to
be unmoved and unsympathetic. But, for all its faults, Congress rarely
moves without taking the opportunity to investigate the true nature of
the problems it is being asked to solve. Proponents of the Owners Bill
are apparently willing to take the risk that their agenda can survive
this investigation. If their strategy were limited just to the recounting
of scary stories, the worst they could be accused of would be stretch-
ing the truth for dramatic effect. As the next section reveals, however,
the public discourse of the ESA's enemies in Congress contains a
much more virulent, and much less defensible, element.
79. Burns Statement, supra note 62.
80. Shuler, 1993 NOAA LEXIS 14 at *14-*15.
81. Id. at *27.
82. Id.
83. Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1335 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1114 (1989).
84. See Christy v. Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for writ of certiorari); Geoffrey L. Harrison, Comment, The Endangered Spe-
cies Act and Ursine Usurpations: A Grizzly Tale of Two Takings, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
1101 (1991); David S. Klain, Casenote, Does the Endangered Species Act Deprive an
Owner of Fundamental Constitutional Rights: Christy v. Hodel, 12 GEo. MASON U. L.
REV. 421 (1990).
LEGISLATIVE BACKLASH
II. WRAPPED IN THE FLAG: ESA AS ANTI-AMERICAN
The property rights movement's rhetorical assault on the ESA is
not confined to story-telling. Proponents of the Owners Bill, for ex-
ample, have supplemented their tales of horror with an equally scary
portrait of the individuals, organizations, and institutions who imple-
ment and support federal endangered species legislation.
The statements attributed to sponsors of the Owners Bill excerpted
in Table I present a dramatic contrast. On one side stand the defend-
ers of private property, the Constitution, the American way of life,
democratic government, free enterprise, and mainstream America.
The other side is populated by extremists, radicals, unelected and
overzealous bureaucrats, and, yes, even communists.
TABLE I
PROPONENTS OF THE OWNERS DEFENDERS OF THE ESA AND THE
BILL AND THE PRINCIPLES THEY PRINCIPLES THEY REPRESENT
REPRESENT
"Of all the freedoms we enjoy in "Just as the Former Soviet Union
this country, the ability to own, and Eastern Bloc are discovering
care for, and develop private the critical need for private
property is perhaps the most property, there are those in this
crucial to our free enterprise country who in the name of
economy."85  environmental protection would
seek to destroy the right to use
your own land."8 6
"It is the concept of private "At best these extremists tend to
property and respect of property believe that our traditional notions
rights that is one of the of private property are old
cornerstones of our free and fashioned throw backs to our
democratic society."8 7  capitalist past that have outlived
their usefulness. At worst they
believe that all resources are to be
shared by the masses and that they
should be managed by the
government for the benefit of
all. ,8
8
85. 140 Cong. Rec. S2639 (Mar. 9, 1994) (Statement of Sen. Don Nickles)
[hereinafter Nickles Statement], available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Record File.
86. 140 Cong. Rec. E233 (Feb. 23, 1994) (Statement of Rep. Don Young)
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"So sacred and important are these
[private property] rights, that our
forefathers chose to specifically
protect them in the fifth
amendment to the U.S.
Constitution ... '"89
"the right and means to
expeditiously appeal decisions by
unelected bureaucrats"; "swift and
fair compensation to those
property owners who happen to
own land where the bald eagle
likes to nest or the fountain darter
likes to swim"91
"federal bureaucrats who ignore
the rights our ancestors fought and
died for more than two centuries
ago ,,9
"overzealous bureaucrats [who
should be prevented] from using
their authority in ways which
threaten property rights." 92
"the environmental movement of "environmental laws and
old, the movement that grew out regulations that have lost touch
of conservatism and the desire not with reason and reality,
94
only to be good stewards of the
land, but to ensure the quality of
the human environment as well" 93
"According to a recent national "extremist environmental
poll, [the] more than 90 percent of groups"9
Americans [who] support efforts to
protect private-property rights." 95
"I support the goals of our nation's "Unfortunately, there is a growing
environmental laws, such as the attitude within the federal
Endangered Species Act."97  bureaucracy that it is acceptable to
disregard the legal rights of private
property owners, as long as the
goal is a laudable one.
89. Nickles Statement, supra note 85.
90. Jack Fields, Proposed Measure Won't Leave Wetlands Owners High and Dry,
HOUSTON POST, July 17, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
91. Fields Statement, supra note 39.
92. Nickles Statement, supra note 85.
93. Tauzin I, supra note 2.
94. Id.
95. Tauzin II, supra note 18.
96. Tauzin I, supra note 2; Tauzin II, supra note 18.
97. Tauzin I, supra note 2.
98. 140 Cong. Rec. E237 (Feb. 23, 1994) (Statement of Rep. Billy Tauzin)
[hereinafter Tauzin Statement], available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Record File.
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Owners Bill "is not about creating
new rights. Rather, it is about
preserving old rights." 99
"Radical environmentalists
disagree with the Founding Fathers
who wrote and ratified the
Constitution, arguing that the
Endangered Species Act (ESA),
federal wetlands regulations and
other environmental protection
measures should supersede the
Constitution."'100
"This bill reaffirms our'basic "many people in the Federal
property rights and returns some bureaucracy [who] believe that
balance to our legal system."''1  public protection of health, safety,
and the environment is not
compatible with protection of
private property rights"'
10 2
"The private property owners bill "We have new tyrants depriving us
of rights reawakens America's of our inalienable rights of life,
commitment to the concept of liberty, and property-King
private ownership of property."' 0 3  George has been replaced by
bureaucrats and kangaroo rats."' 4
CONCLUSION
The new Congress is being treated to more of this same rhetoric, as
the House and Senate begin serious debate over the takings provi-
sions included in the Republicans' Contract with America. 10 5 Ironi-
cally, the Owners Bill, with its fifty percent threshold and focus on but
two federal statutes, is moderate in comparison with proposals tied
more closely to the Contract.
10 6
The faux horror stories recited above and the Manichaean division
symbolized by Table I should trouble those concerned about and en-
gaged in the crucial debate over the future of federal environmental
regulation. Perhaps the best we can hope for is that-at the drafting
stage, during crucial votes, or as the President considers a veto-com-
mon sense, not false fear or patriotic posturing, will prevail.
99. 140 Cong. Rec. S2639 (Feb. 22, 1994) (Statement of Sen. Richard Shelby)
[hereinafter Shelby Statement], available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Record File.
100. Fields Statement, supra note 39.
101. Id.
102. Nickles Statement, supra note 84.
103. Tauzin Statement, supra note 97.
104. Fields Statement, supra note 39.
105. See, e.g., Proposed Employer "Bill of Rights" Dumped; Alternative Provisions
Adopted, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Feb. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
106. See supra note 13.
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APPENDIX
103RD CONGRESS; 2ND SESSION
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES




To require certain Federal agencies to protect the rights of private
property owners.
TEXT:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Private Property Owners Bill of
Rights."
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds the following:
(1) Our democracy was founded on principles of ownership, use,
and control of private property. These principles are embodied
in the fifth amendment to the Constitution prohibiting the taking
of private property without the payment of just compensation.
(2) A number of Federal environmental programs, specifically
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.) and
section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C.
1344) have been implemented by employees, agents, and repre-
sentatives of the Federal Government in a manner that deprives
private property owners of the use and control of their property.
(3) As new Federal programs are proposed that would limit and
restrict the use of private property to provide habitat for plant
and animal species, the rights of private property owners must be
recognized and respected.
(4) Private property owners are being forced by Federal policy to
resort to extensive, lengthy, and expensive litigation to protect
certain basic civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
(5) Since many private property owners do not have the financial
resources or the extensive commitment of time to proceed in liti-
gation against the Federal Government, a clear Federal policy is
needed to guide and direct Federal agencies with respect to their
implementation of environmental laws that directly impact pri-
vate property.
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(6) While all private property owners should and must abide by
current nuisance laws and should not use their property in a man-
ner that harms their neighbors, these laws have traditionally been
enacted, implemented, and enforced at the State and local levels
where they are best able to protect the rights of all private prop-
erty owners and local citizens.
(7) While traditional pollution control laws are intended to pro-
tect the general public's health and physical welfare, current
habitat protection programs are intended to protect the welfare
of plant and animal species, while allowing the recreational and
esthetic opportunities for the public.
(b) PURPOSES.-It is the purpose of this Act to provide a consis-
tent Federal policy to encourage, support, and promote the private
ownership of property and to ensure that the constitutional and legal
rights of private property owners are protected by the Federal Gov-
ernment, its employees, agents, and representatives.
SEC. 3. PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS.
(a) In implementing and enforcing the Acts, each agency head shall
comply with applicable State and tribal government laws, including
laws relating to private property rights and privacy; and shall adminis-
ter and implement the Acts in a manner that has the least impact on
private property owners' constitutional and other legal rights.
(b) Each agency head shall develop and implement rules and regula-
tions for ensuring that the constitutional and other legal rights of pri-
vate property owners are protected when the agency head makes, or
participates with other agencies in the making of, any final decision
that restricts the use of private property.
SEC. 4. PROPERTY OWNER CONSENT FOR ENTRY.
(a) An agency head may not enter privately-owned property to col-
lect information regarding the property, unless the private property
owner has-
(1) consented in writing to that entry;
(2) after providing that consent, been provided notice of that en-
try; and
(3) been notified that any raw data collected from the property
must be made available at no cost, if requested by the private
property owner.
(b) Subsection (a) does not prohibit entry onto property for the pur-
pose of obtaining consent or providing notice required under subsec-
tion (a).
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SEC. 5. RIGHT TO REVIEW AND DISPUTE DATA
COLLECTED FROM PRIVATE PROPERTY.
An agency head may not use data that is collected on privately-owned
property to implement or enforce any of the Acts, unless-
(1) the agency head has provided to the private property
owner-
(A) access to the information;
(B) a detailed description of the manner in which the infor-
mation was collected; and
(C) an opportunity to dispute the accuracy of the informa-
tion; and
(2) the agency head has determined that the information is accu-
rate, if the private property owner disputes the information pur-
suant to subparagraph (C).
SEC. 6. RIGHT TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL OF
WETLANDS DECISIONS.
Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C.
1344) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
"(u) ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS.-
"(1) The Secretary or Administrator shall, after notice and
opportunity for public comment, issue rules to establish pro-
cedures to allow private property owners or their authorized
representatives an opportunity for an administrative appeal
of the following actions under this section:
"(A) A determination of regulatory jurisdiction over a
particular parcel of property.
"(B) The denial of a permit.
"(C) The terms and conditions of a permit.
"(D) The imposition of an administrative penalty.
"(E) The imposition of an order requiring the private
property owner to restore or otherwise alter the
property.
"(2) Rules issued under paragraph (1) shall provide that any
administrative appeal of an action described in paragraph (1)
shall be heard and decided by an official other than the offi-
cial who took the action, and shall be conducted at a location
which is in the vicinity of the property involved in the
action.".
SEC. 7. RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL UNDER
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973.
Section 11 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. 1540) is
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
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"(i) ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS.-
"(1) The Secretary shall, after notice and opportunity for
public comment, issue rules to establish procedures to allow
private property owners or their authorized representatives
an opportunity for an administrative appeal of the following
actions under this Act:
"(A) A determination that a particular parcel of prop-
erty is critical habitat of a listed species.
"(B) The denial of a permit for an incidental take.
"(C) The terms and conditions of an incidental take
permit.
"(D) The imposition of an administrative penalty.
"(E) The imposition of an order prohibiting or substan-
tially limiting the use of the property.
"(2) Rules issued under paragraph (1) shall provide that any
administrative appeal of an action described in paragraph (1)
shall be heard and decided by an official other than the offi-
cial who took the action, and shall be conducted at a location
which is in the vicinity of the parcel of property involved in
the action.".
SEC. 8. COMPENSATION FOR TAKING OF
PRIVATE PROPERTY.
(a) ELIGIBILITY.-A private property owner , that, as a conse-
quence of a final qualified agency ,action of an agency head, is de-
prived of 50 percent or more of the fair market value, or the
economically viable use, of the affected portion of the property, as
determined by a qualified appraisal expert, is entitled to receive com-
pensation in accordance with this section.
(b) DEADLINE.-Within 90 days after receipt of a final decision of
an agency head that deprives a private property owner of fair market
value or viable use of property for which compensation is required
under subsection (a), the private property owner may submit in writ-
ing a request to the agency head for compensation in accordance with
subsection (c).
(c) AGENCY HEAD'S OFFER.-bThe agency head, within 180 days
after the receipt of a request for compensation, shall stay the decision
and shall provide to the private property owner -
(1) an offer to purchase the affected property of the private prop-
erty owner at a fair market value assuming no use restrictions
under the Acts; and
(2) an offer to compensate the private property owner for the
difference between the fair market value of the property without
those restrictions and the fair market value of the property with
those restrictions.
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(d) PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNERS' RESPONSE.-A private
property owner shall have 60 days after the date of receipt of the
agency head's offers under subsection (c) (1) and (2) to accept one of
the offers or to reject both offers. If the private property owner re-
jects both offers, the private property owner may submit the matter
for arbitration to an arbitrator appointed by the agency head from a
list of arbitrators submitted to the agency head by the American Arbi-
tration Association. The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance
with the real estate valuation arbitration rules of that association. For
purposes of this section, an arbitration is binding on the agency head
and a private property owner as to the amount, if any, of compensa-
tion owed to the private property owner and whether for purposes of
this section the private property owner has been deprived of fair mar-
ket value or viable use of property for which compensation is required
under subsection (a).
(e) JUDGMENT.-A qualified agency action of an agency head that
deprives a private property owner of property as described in subsec-
tion (a), is deemed, at the option of the private property owner to be a
taking under the Constitution of the United States and a judgment
against the United States if the private property owner-
(1) accepts the agency head's offer under subsection (c); or
(2) submits to arbitration under subsection (d).
(f) PAYMENT.-An agency head shall pay a private property owner
any compensation required under the terms of an offer of the agency
head that is accepted by the private property owner in accordance
with subsection (d), or under a decision of an arbiter under that sub-
section, by not later than 60 days after the date of the acceptance or
the date of the issuance of the decision, respectively.
(g) FORM OF PAYMENT.-Payment under this section, as that
form is agreed to by the agency head and the private property owner,
may be in the form of-
(1) payment of an amount equal to the fair market value of the
property on the day before the date of the final qualified agency
action with respect to which the property or interest is acquired;
(2) a payment of an amount equal to the reduction in value; or
(3) conveyance of real property or an interest in real property
having a fair market value equal to that amount.
(h) OTHER RIGHTS PRESERVED.-This section does not pre-
empt, alter, or limit the availability of any remedy for the taking of
property or an interest in property that is available under the Consti-
tution or any other law.
(i) FINAL JUDGMENTS.-When a private property owner unsuc-
cessfully seeks compensation under this section and thereafter files a
claim for compensation under the fifth amendment to the Constitu-
tion and is successful in obtaining a final judgment ordering compen-
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sation from the claims court for that claim, the agency head making
the final agency decision resulting in the taking shall reimburse the
judgment fund for the amount of the judgment against the United
States from funds appropriated to the agency for the 2 fiscal years
following payment.
SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS.
For the purpose of this Act the following definitions apply:
(1) "The Acts" means the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16
U.S.C. 1531 et seq.) and the section 404 of the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1344).
(2) "Agency head" means the Secretary or Administrator with
jurisdiction or authority to take a final agency action under the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.) or sec-
tion 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C.
1344).
(3) "Non-Federal person" means a person other than an officer,
employee, agent, department, or instrumentality of-
(A) the Federal Government; or
(B) a foreign government.
(4) "Private property owner" means a non-Federal person (other
than an officer, employee, agent, department, or instrumentality
of a State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State, or a
State, municipality, or subdivision of a State) that-
(A) owns property referred to in paragraph (5) (A) or (B);
or
(B) holds property referred to in paragraph (5)(C).
(5) "Property" means-
(A) and;
(B) any interest in land; and
(C) any proprietary water right.
(6) "Qualified agency action" means an agency action (as that
term is defined in section 551(13) of title 5, United States Code)
that is-
(A) under section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act (33 U.S.C. 1344); or
(B) under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C.
1531 et seq.).
SEC. 10. PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNER PARTICIPATION IN
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.
Section 6 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. 1535) is
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
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"(j) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, when
the Secretary enters into a management agreement under subsec-
tion (b) with any non-Federal person that establishes restrictions
on the use of property, the Secretary shall notify all private prop-
erty owners or lessees of the property that is subject to the man-
agement agreement and shall provide an opportunity for each
private property owner or lessee to participate in the manage-
ment agreement."
